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1. Introduction 
 
The importance of security in database research has greatly increased over 
the years as most of critical functionality of the business and military enterprises 
became digitized. Database is an integral part of any information system and they 
often hold sensitive data.  The security of the data depends on physical security, 
OS security and DBMS security.  Database security can be compromised by 
obtaining sensitive data, changing data or degrading availability of the database.  
Over the last 30 years the information technology environment have gone through 
many changes of evolution and the database research community have tried to 
stay a step ahead of the upcoming threats to the database security. 
 
 
CERT 2003 
On the first glance the CERT chart above suggests a losing battle.  In reality 
database research is not too blame for the trend observed.  The changing 
environment, non secure implementations and user errors is a main contributor to the 
explosive growth of the IT incidents and vulnerabilities.   
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As systems become more modular and sophisticated attacker is presented with 
more vectors to conduct an attack.  More over the attacker motivation have changed 
during the last 30 years.  The technical barriers for executing an attack have also 
largely disappeared with easily available set of hacking toolkits as can be seen from 
this CERT 2000 visualization.  Notice that we have marked with red circles the areas 
where database implementations were to blame for many of these security breaches. 
Often times vendors created back doors and default passwords on their password.  
For long time they did not support encryption for data in transit and the data could be 
eavesdropped over the network. 
The database research community has thoughts about these issues long before 
they were address by the implementations.  This paper will examine the different 
topics pertaining to database security and see the adaption of the research to the 
changing environment.  Some short term database research trends will be ascertained 
at the conclusion. 
 
2. The Early Years (pre 1980) 
 
During this period database management system, especially the Relational model 
wasn’t wide spread and its applications were handful. Government organizations like the 
Department of Defense (DOD) were the first to give high importance to security of data 
since their repository contained crucial data like the military data and census data. The 
commercial applications, very few though, were not greatly under threat since a formal 
security model was still under research. Organizations framed the security policies based 
on the few vulnerabilities identified. The physical and logical threats were identified.  
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Physical threats were very well understood and security mechanisms were in place 
like securing the servers in authorized rooms. Logical threats were facing challenges and 
the security controls were not strong enough. Database systems were mostly static and 
offline. There was not much access of the systems across a wide network. Data wasn’t 
stored across shared resources\repositories. The users accessed the systems over a trusted 
subsystem\environment relying mostly on the security of the underlying operating 
systems. Such trusted environment proved vulnerable to certain attacks like the trapdoors 
and Trojan Horse. 
 
2.1. Environmental Threats 
 
It is worth mentioning the nature of the attackers during this period. Attackers were 
mostly sophisticated users who pursued attacks as a challenge.  Often, attackers used 
custom tools mostly developed by them or no tools at all. As a result, the attacks were not 
very destructive and sophisticated attack tools were not available to non sophisticated 
users.  
 
Since the database systems were not applied to store data in shared resources, the 
major threats were in the inference of statistical data by users. Statistical databases were 
used to store data about the population or military information which were intended for 
aggregating useful information to be used by statisticians. 
  
Statistical Inference: 
The data stored in database system were queried to get the aggregate results. The 
query sets proved a threat since by simple observation of the query sets, information 
about individuals could be easily compromised. Based on the inference channel, the 
attacks can be classified as: 
 
Direct attacks: 
 
The attackers observed the queries and applied rules like n-item k-percent rule which 
says that an attribute of data which shows up for at least n items more than k percent of 
the result queried can be inferred. 
 
Indirect attacks: 
The aggregate results could be interpreted and Trackers could be applied on such 
results set to draw sensitive information. A Tracker is a simple formulation applied on the 
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data like the intersection of query sets. A Tracker is analogous to a snooping tool, 
powerful though simple. 
2.2. Mainstream Research 
 
The main research was focused on the inference of sensitive data in statistical 
databases. The access control also gained momentum wherein models were proposed to 
restrict access to users based on the privilege of the users. 
2.2.1. Inference 
 
Active research was going on in understanding a Tracker and modeling 
controls to overcome such trackers. A common feature of a tracker is to control 
the set of records queried [1]. A control called Random Sample Queries [RSQ] 
was proposed in [1]. The basis of RSQ was to introduce uncertainty in the results 
so that the attacker cannot get reliable estimates of confidential data. The scheme 
works based on a probability measure for each record located. Whenever a record 
is located satisfying a characteristic C, the system determines if that record can be 
kept in the sampled query set. So, every time C is used, ideally same sample set 
should be used. 
2.2.2. Access Control 
 
Access control was one of the earliest security controls to be studied.  While 
access control for file systems was well established an access control for DBMS 
did not fit well with that model.  Access control for database was to be expressed 
in terms of logical data model with authorizations in terms of relations and tuples.  
It also had to be content aware to allow the system determine whether access 
should be granted based on the content of the data item.  An important and 
benchmark work on access control was done for military applications by Bell and 
La Padula. This was imperative during this period because of the classified data 
stored in military applications. Data could belong to different levels and people 
accessing such data were given permissions based on the level of the user and the 
level of data sought by the user. This came out to be called the famous lattice 
model or the Bell-LaPadula model(BLP). A lattice model consists of various 
levels and objects belonged to any of these levels based on the sensitivity of the 
data. Typical classification of military data was Top Secret, Secret, etc. The users 
were also mapped to one of the level in the user lattice. So, this model ensured 
that users could not read\write sensitive data higher or lower in the hierarchy. This 
model was developed to formalize the US Department of Defense multilevel 
security policy [4]. The BLP model was not completely applied in database 
management system until the early 1980s. 
 
3. Growth to Maturity (1981-1990) 
 
In the early 1980s, commercial applications using database systems started spreading. 
The attackers were motivated more out of the competition. Sophistication of tools used 
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for attacks improved to enable attackers to exploit vulnerabilities with minimum 
knowledge of the target environment. Database systems were required to be stored in 
shared resources, increasing the need for security across the network and the users. 
 
 
3.1. Environmental Threats 
 
Most of the enterprises did not yet allow external connectivity but the number dumb 
terminal was replaced with client server model.  The clients could not longer be fully 
trusted because these machines could be compromised.  The database users were no 
longer necessarily technologist and were more likely to cause errors in the systems.  
This along with the fact that several departments were often sharing the same 
database required an access control. 
 
3.2. Mainstream Research 
 
The access control models which did not achieve any significant results continued 
to be the research focus while the statistical inference was also given importance 
which eventually diminished by mid 1980s. The following sections review the work 
done in these two areas. 
3.2.1. Inference 
 
Initial work during 1970s on inference proved futile since one of many 
arbitrary queries could break the controls. A breakthrough was achieved was the 
lattice model was applied which provided better understanding of inferences by 
the intruder. Suppression techniques and Perturbing techniques were applied to 
deny statistically useful information from getting leaked. Suppression techniques 
enforced restrictions on the set of allowable statistics. Different methods like 
suppressing the entire table or the individual cells were considered in this 
technique [2]. Perturbation techniques applied noise in the statistics either at the 
record level or the result level. The Random Sample Query (RSQ) discussed 
during the 1970s comes under this technique. 
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But not much of significant work on inference problems was followed in the 
mid 1980s. After early 1980s, work on statistical inference was stalled since 
statistical data was almost always subject to compromise through one of the 
several arbitrary ways [3]. Severe restrictions could lead to stale data not useful 
for statisticians 
 
3.2.2. Access Control 
 
The focus on security policies and mechanisms improved leading to 
increased momentum in area like the access control. Extensive research was 
carried on in access control and several models were proposed. Another area 
which also started seeing challenges was the multilevel database security. With 
models like the Bell-LaPadula model setting a benchmark in the security of 
classified multilevel data, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) models were 
researched. The Discretionary Access Controls (DAC) specified the rules which 
allowed the users, at their discretion, to create and delete objects, grant and revoke 
authorization for users.   
 
DAC:  
Access Matrix Model: The access rights (read, write, modify, delete, etc) 
were driven by this model which provides the permission for the subjects to act on 
an object (relations, views, attributes, etc). The rows represent subjects while 
columns represent objects and the entries represent access rights. Implementations 
based on this include authorization lists and capability lists. This model served as 
a powerful tool for implementing, studying and comparing access rights. 
[Denning et al.]. A relational implementation of this model was introduced in 
System R in which the access rights were maintained in a relation containing 
tuples of the form (Subject, Object, Access Right). 
 
Query Modification: INGRES adopted this model which was similar to 
Access Matrix Model in addition to giving access control to views of each 
relation. 
In System R, granting and revoking permissions was controlled using “copy flag” 
which had cascading revoking effect. SeaView project applied similar approach 
as System R for DAC but also applied not so found features then like 
authorization denials and precedence of rights.[2]  
 
MAC 
The shared databases required stringent policies for the users to get 
clearance in accessing data. Classified data could not be accessed by a user with a 
simple access right since the data could be highly sensitive to users based on the 
privilege of the users. As mentioned in [2], a mandatory policy formulates the 
following properties:  
ReadP roperty: S can read d only if 
secrecy-class(d) <= secrecy-class(S) 
integrity-class(d) >= integrity-class(S) 
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WriteP roperty: S can write d only if 
secrecy-class(S) <= secrecy-class(d) and 
integrity-class(S)>= integrity-class(d). 
 
No commercial system had implemented this model successfully in multi-
level databases and research was still on. Research projects proposed few security 
models: I.P. Sharp model, the Hinke/Schaefer model, the TRW model, Navy 
surveillance model and SRI/Gemini Sea View Project [2]. Different system 
architectures which isolated security into kernel modules also played a vital role 
in providing the crucial mandatory controls. Some of them were decomposed 
database architecture and integrity lock architecture. Using decomposed database 
architecture required considerable changes on existing database before this 
architecture could be deployed to support multilevel relations and to interface 
with a security kernel. Integrity lock architecture did not require many changes on 
existing database but compromised on the assurance of mandatory security [2]. 
 
3.2.3. Encryption 
 
Though access control model were developed and found to ensure security, 
there were always chances of those access controls to be bypassed leading to a 
breach. To enforce the second layer of security, data being stored in the repository 
could be modified and stored in an encrypted format. This idea gave way to 
research in the design possibilities of databases. 
 
Two of such designs were Access Control Kernels and Encrypted Databases. 
Access Kernels were based on isolating and containing security policies inside 
separate modules. The downside of this design was that the value-dependent 
access restrictions were not possible. Trueblood et al [5] also provided modules 
based design in which security module was sandwiched between User & 
Application module and Storage\Retrieval module. These kernel architectures 
suffered from strong protection capabilities because of closeness to physical 
architecture than logical views\relations. The cryptographic technique of using 
keys to encrypt and store data was applied to achieve security. There were many 
restrictions and challenges like operations\computations on encrypted data, view-
based protection, etc. 
 
4. Rapid Data Expansion (1991-2000) 
 
The digital environment during this era went through massive transformation 
driven by the rapid commercialization.  The creation of Windows browser along with the 
realization that World Wide Web can be used for more than just information sharing, but 
actual commerce had a tremendous impact on the digital information exposure that made 
the security requirement of early 90’s very different from the late 90’s. 
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 Another dominant development in computer science at this time was the 
programming methodology of Object Oriented Programming.  These concepts have been 
added to many of the programming language of the time and it was natural for the 
database community to ascertain the efficient way to deal with complex object data.  
ODBMS (Object Oriented Database) took roots at this time as an alternative to RDBMS 
that is better suited for certain tasks commonly associated with OOP. 
 
 Towards the end of this era Online Analytical Processing (OLAP) became another 
important environmental component driving research.  With large volumes of electronic 
data and digitalization of many aspects of the commerce efficient metric gathering 
became an important direction in research. 
 
 
The widespread adaption of PC and spread of the Internet signaled the end of the 
isolated enterprises. Corporations wanted to have a presence to rip the benefits of 
WWW commerce and to advertise their products.  Most put up perimeter defenses in 
the form of the firewalls to control which of their internal servers could be connected 
to from the un-trusted Internet and over which protocols.  Enterprises widely adapted 
access controls for their internal database users.  More and more users and application 
because users of the database servers.  These users were often no longer SQL aware 
as application front ends because standard, shielding users from requiring technical 
expertise to use databases at this time.   
 
While some departments used segregated servers many shared databases and 
required proper access control to maintain the principles of “need to know” and “least 
privilege”.  The Database administrators were still held under the assumption of full 
trust.  Firewalls did not allow direct access to the database from any users on the 
untrusted Internet, which limited certain attack vectors. 
 
4.1. Environmental Threats 
 
Connectivity to the Internet brought about addition of untrusted connections.  
While firewalls provided protection against direct database attacks, the application 
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front-end to the database were left vulnerable.  Many applications did not provide 
adequate input validation and were susceptible to SQL Injections, which allowed 
attackers to insert harmful scripts into a database.  This combined with the fact that 
many database vendors left database with default accounts and passwords often 
allowed attackers to compromises database from the Internet. 
 
Earlier in the time period the attackers often were driven by publicity.  Many 
countries did not yet enact strict computer crime laws and publicity was seen as an 
acceptable path to financial success as a top computer security consultant.  The 
attackers therefore were often resulting to highly visible destructive tactics.  It was 
increasingly critical for organizations to be able to reliability recover from these 
attacks. 
 
Insider threat has grown as a concern as the number of individuals with access to 
the database grew with the propagation of online databases and computers at the 
workplace.  The complexity and modularity of the database has also increased 
creating more attack vectors. 
 
The introduction of data mining expanded the treat to individual privacy.  Even 
with perfect access control and encryption the individual data can still be abused by a 
valid user.  With database holding information from dozens of sources given an 
attacker an even better capability to inference. While data mining tools such as OLAP 
can be used for good such as counter-terrorist they can also be used to undermine the 
civil liberties of the individuals. Some government regulations such as HIPAA and 
FFIEC were established to safeguard individual privacy during this time. 
4.2. Mainstream Research 
 
Reviewing the database security related topics of this time reveals a heavy focus 
on refinement of access controls, privacy protection and efficient data encryption. 
4.2.1. Privacy Protection 
 
We have seen that Inference problem has a long history in database research.  
While up to 1990 these research focused on statistical databases the introduction 
of data warehousing change that.  Just prior to our time period it was shown that 
the general inference problem was unsolvable [7][8].   In effect, the more 
inference controls were placed on the database it would became increasingly 
unusable.  These early research did not have to concern itself with data mining 
from multiple sources.  Many different techniques were introduced to deal with 
this problem that allowed for a compromise between system usability and privacy 
protection.  Most fall in two groups.  One approach is to modify data in some way 
so that a confidence of the sensitive association is reduced.  Some techniques 
were research to estimate how much such perturbation impact the quality of the 
results. [9]. A data can also be sampled appropriately to be chosen in such a way 
as to many any inference from this data have a low degree of confidence. [10] 
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Another approach is an inference controller that is capable of detection and 
prevention of the inference attack. [11] 
 
4.2.2. Access Control 
 
While early work on integration database with mandatory and discretional 
access control produced break though such as System R Authorization Model, it 
was too rigid and suited for closed and controlled environments. The research of 
these models still continued. Mandatory access provided a higher level of 
security. Some research articulated a concept of polyinstantiation, or having 
multiple copies with different security levels of the same tuple in relation. 
[12][13]  
 
Second half of this of this time period saw the emergence of the Extensible 
Markup Language (XML) as a new standard in describing data in documents 
moved over the Internet.  It was realized early on that security was paramount in 
adaption of the new standard. XML access controls were developing along with 
parallel efforts on XML Encryption and Digital Signature.  The nested structure 
of XML data required flexible protection object granularity.  Most of the XML 
access control suggested therefore adapted to yes/no authorization and ex/implicit 
authorization that can be associated with a single document, such as a document 
specifying XML structure; document type definition (DTD).[14][15][16] 
 
Also, the development of distributed object systems and e-commerce 
applications resulted in developments or object oriented access control. In fact, 
most of access control research at this time centered on role based and object 
oriented issues which we will now discuss in more detail. 
. 
4.2.2.1. RBAC 
 
Role Based Access Control was often better suited for organizations 
than mandatory or discretionarily access control.  RBAC is a type of 
discretionary access control where authorization administration is 
simplified around the notion of a role.  Authorizations are given as need 
arises for an individual to perform a certain activity, rather than granted 
directly to user.  Users are made up for roles thereby acquiring these 
authorizations.  
 
RBAC is better suited for role hierarchies then other types of 
discretionary access controls as role-sub role relationships can be easily 
implied enabling authorization inheritance.  Separation of Duties 
constraints can also be enforced easier since RBAC is centered on roles 
not users, thereby preventing a single user from receiving excessive 
authorizations.   
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Several RBAC models have been investigated [17]. RBAC model have 
been extended to add temporal dimension [18].  A standard have been 
developed for an XML based encoding of RBAC [16].  The development 
of the administrative models [18][19] and security analysis techniques[20] 
realized significant activity during this time.  The implementation of these 
advanced features in the commercial products has been lagging.  Many 
database vendors never did provide role based administrative 
functionalities into their products during this period and none provide 
temporal ones. 
4.2.2.2. ODBMS 
 
Access control defined for relational databases do not suit well ODBMS. 
ODBMS access control system has to account for semantic modeling 
constructs often found in OO such as composite objects, versions and 
inheritance properties.  With such complex data model a more fine grained 
protections system had to be developed for ODBMS.  Both discretionary and 
mandatory access control systems were introduced to address this problem.  
The Orion object oriented DBMS was the first comprehensive discretionary 
access control model.[21].  
Mandatory access control model for ODBMS are difficult to define due to 
the semantic richness of the OO.  While research in this area was conducted 
[22]during this time little of practical significance was gained. 
 
4.2.3. Encryption 
 
It was realized early that whichever access control the database contained the 
adversary still had a way accessing the underlying data by looking directly in the 
file system or underlying storage.  However, for a long time cryptographic 
capabilities required a heavy cost burden for database operations and were not 
included in any implementations.  With increases in processing speed supporting 
encryption of stored data became feasible in early 2000.  At the same time several 
cases of adversaries and white hat hackers showed how easy it was to obtaining 
information from old discarded corporate hard drives.  For databases supporting 
encryption of raw data created an additional issue for database optimization 
techniques, such as indexing. For example, if a column of a table containing 
sensitive information was encrypted the entire table would have to be scanned to 
provide a result to a query.  Work on finding order preserving encryption for 
different data types is an active area of research.[23] 
 
Data base federation allows integration of several autonomous database to act 
as a transparent single database.  Queries can traverse from one database to other 
and often full trust can not be assumed between independent instances.  A query 
may need to be performed without plaintext data being available to the database 
executing the query.[24] 
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One of the key aspects of security is the separation of duties and dual control.  
For a long time the databases were considering and adversary as an external entity 
being able to compromise data by subverting access control or via statistical 
inference.  For a long time internal root user of DBA was considered to be fully 
trusted.  Access control was not sufficient by itself to address to issue of DBA 
being able to exercise complete control over the data residing in the database.  
Early work concentrated on database implementations simply separating audit 
function from the DBA sphere of influence. Solutions often allowed logging all 
changes to the database in a stand along log file to which DBA had limited access.  
While helping with post incident detection and investigation this approach 
however did prevent the attack.  Encryption provide a way to encrypt data in the 
database and store an encryption key external to the database thereby preventing 
the DBA from accessing the data [25]. 
 
5. Data Security Consolidation (post 2001) 
 
This period thought data becoming ubiquitous.  The new data types such as spatial 
and continuous sensor data entered the database field. 
 
 
 
Personal information about individual became readily available through public 
records and via social Web 2.0 phenomena.  The overall network has not changed much 
from the earlier decade fundamentally.  Encryption became more common for the data 
not only in transit but at rest.  User authentication methods have also been upgraded due 
to the threat posed by exploitation of the web applications up fronting critical data 
systems.  Many institutions now use one time password devices and device fingerprinting 
technologies to more securely authenticate their users. 
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5.1. Environmental Threats 
 
This period saw the emergence of information security attack as a large 
multi-billion businesses.  Attackers have built sophisticated command and control 
networks running on millions of compromised computers.  Attackers have also 
used sophisticated security techniques such as BitTorrent protocol and encryption 
to build resiliency and security around their perimeter.  Attackers have also 
attempted to minimize any impact on the compromised system to limit the 
possibility of detection.  Many tools are available today to conduct such attacks or 
utilize an attack service for a fee.  The attackers have developed sophisticated 
business plans and many different avenues to profitability. 
 
5.2. Mainstream Research 
 
Research in access control have continued incorporating new data types such 
as spatial and sensor network data.  With continues queries exhibited by sensor 
network access control could no longer make an authorization determination prior 
to query execution.  It had to be able to account for temporal dimension as well to 
be effective.   
  
 Digital Right Management research also became prominent at the time 
with marking and pattern based detecting media data types in order to prevent 
intellectual data piracy. 
5.2.1. Privacy Protection 
 
Not all privacy concerns are driven by inference attacks. There was also 
research in anonymization of the data to protect privacy in the cases where the 
data is to be shared with the third party. [26].  Also, some suggested approaches to 
design database specifically tailored to support standard privacy policies such as 
the ones expressed in P3P. Paper [27] introduced a concept of Hippocratic 
databases that could support HIPPA requirement among others.  These 
approaches use some privacy metadata consisting of privacy policies and privacy 
authorization tables.  Paper [27] proposes a special attribute “purpose” to each 
table to perform privacy checking during query processing.  Each query is issued 
with the purpose and the system checks the user, content and purpose based on 
privacy authorization table. Efficient are retention are some of the problem 
surrounding such approach and remain unresolved. 
5.2.2. Access Control 
 
More recently database systems have seen the emergence of new data types 
that require their own security controls.  Restricting availability of string data type 
to a user is very different from restricting access to a specific view on a map grid 
if we take spatial data for example.  There is an active research area of access 
control for spatial data with RBAC adoption to spatial data [28].  Some work is 
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done on discovering mathematical authorization modes that would fit well with 
geographic data [29]. 
 
5.2.3. Encryption 
 
We have yet to find any research of efficient encryption on this data in 
storage to counteract the threat posed by bypassing access controls and reading 
this data directly from storage media.  It would appear that methods need to be 
found that could be used to secure this data but still allow efficient R-Tree 
indexing.  Performing geometry encryption in such a way that operands such as 
intersect can be conducted on encrypted data may be the subject of future 
research.  
 
5.2.4. Attack Detection 
 
With attackers attempting to minimize impact on the target system 
researches had to tackle a problem of detecting a compromise.  A side channel 
attack detection research is ongoing and many intrusion detection products have 
included database modules. 
 
6. Conclusion and Future Trends 
 
It is important to also note that many problems with securing data stored in the 
database is not due to the lack of research but lacking security in implementation of the 
database product or an application front ending the database.  The shift from full trust to 
partial trust was driven in part by natural tendency to not provide full trust to anyone 
single individual based on dual control principle but also due to the inability of the users 
to keep their own PC computers secure and database frontend not being able to detect 
malicious attacks such as SQL injections. 
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While intense focus on database security in the last 30 years created some welcome 
improvements it was still outpaced by the threat growth.  Data security concerns are 
evolving with new requirements emerging year to year.  The amount to data and the 
complexity and modularity of the databases is grown fast over time.  The recent 
decentralization process of outsourcing data processing creates a difficult problem for 
database security.  Intellectual Property Rights create a need for specific techniques for 
storing and marking this data and appropriate providing access to it.  New data types used 
in spatial and sensor network database require new ways to provide access control and 
encryption.  The semantic web outlook suggests the outsourcing trend to continue with 
related requirement for maintaining confidentiality and integrity of these query 
communications. 
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